British Prime Minister Tony Blair and U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell-and Sen. Hillary Clinton and, yes, Sen. John Kerry-all took that basic position in 2002 because, quite simply, 16 months ago it seemed a reasonable one to take.
President Bush seemed reasonable too, at the time. He had just presented an eloquent ultimatum to the United Nations, after all, galvanizing that torpid institution, mobilizing world opinion and sending something like the fear of God into Saddam Hussein. After years defying the U.N., suddenly the Iraqi dictator allowed its inspectors back into his country, into his palaces, into the forbidden corners of his murderous republic because, and only because, Washington was threatening war and regime change. That was a great and a necessary accomplishment, and recognized as such.
The cliche of the day cast Blair and Powell as “the good cops,” speaking and acting with moderation, urging Bush to go to the U.N. rather than acting alone, promising a way out. Bush–or at least the hawks in his administration-were “the bad cops,” always on the verge of violence, ever ready to terrify and intimidate the suspect Saddam. A little over a year ago, what many people thought, or hoped, was that this was a calculated drama, and clearly it was working. Again and again Saddam, two-bit thug that he is, would put up a tough-guy pose of resistance, then crumble completely. But the war party in the administration just wouldn’t take his “yes” for an answer.
Forget all the technical debate in Washington right now discussing the way the American people and the world were misled about phantom “stockpiles” of ghastly weapons. We were depending on reasonable leaders and members of the administration–especially Powell-to keep U.S. policy rational and avoid war unless it was absolutely necessary. President Bush, for his part, kept saying for the record that’s what he really wanted to do, too.
Looking back, the good cop/bad cop scenario gives you a pretty good picture of what happened, and it’s like something from an episode of “NYPD Blue”:
The suspect is folding, but slowly. “I ain’t got no weapons,” he keeps saying, and every time he holds his head up in defiance, the bad cop threatens him with a baseball bat. The good cop offers a cup of coffee. “C’mon buddy, give us the combination to that safe where you keep the weapons.” The thug gives, but the safe is empty.
Now the bad cop says he is really, really pissed off, and acts it. “Who made these weapons for you. Names! I want names!” The baseball bat is raised high. The thug gives the names, but everybody says the same thing, “no weapons.” Meanwhile, detectives are searching the suspect’s hideout. Nothing. At this point, the good cop starts to figure this is going to be a long, frustrating interrogation, but it’s getting closer to the truth, when suddenly the bad cop goes ballistic. “No more questions,” he says, pulls out his .44 Magnum and blows off the suspect’s head.
In all of these shows, the good cop feels duty bound to cover for a fellow officer. The thug deserved what he got, the good cop tells himself. The thug’s wife and kids, who were terribly battered and abused, are better off without this monster. The bad cop is really a good guy at heart. He really believed the suspect was lying and the clock was ticking and people’s lives were in danger. He acted badly-but in good faith. Let’s give him another chance.
Then the doubts set in, especially after the bad cop moves in with the thug’s battered family, takes over their property and bank accounts, and winds up in a bloody, running battle with his sons and friends. Was the killing premeditated? What if the bad cop had been planning it for years? What if he had an old score he wanted to settle? What if he was only using the good cop to give him a little cover and to make excuses for him? What if he doesn’t really respect the law at all, just his own raw power when he’s got that .44 in his hand? What if what he wanted all along were those bank accounts?
Maybe we should drop the metaphor at this point, because these are just the kinds of rhetorical questions Shadowland readers keep sending in about President Bush and the people around him–questions about their motives. Most of those readers seem convinced by what they’ve read and seen that Bush and his war party had decided on their basic course of action from the earliest days of their administration. There is that oft-remarked line of Bush’s about Saddam trying to kill his daddy. There were the many precedents of the Bush administration walking away from any semblance of international law and order as an unnecessary restraint on American action. There’s the matter of oil. And Halliburton.
But, you know, all that is so much a part of the public record now, it’s not really the “bad cop’s” motives that interest me. It’s those of the “good cop,” or cops. Did Blair and Powell really think they could avert a war by playing along with the war party? Or did they knowingly let themselves be used to dupe American, British and (not very successfully) international opinion? Did they fight for solid rationality and common sense, or did they just provide the veneer? And what about those Democratic senators who voted authorization in October 2002 for Bush to use unilateral action as he deemed necessary against Saddam?
Their explanations at the time sounded somewhere between principled and pusillanimous, and The New Republic summed them up nicely right after the vote with a headline that read “Make War, Not War.” “Bipartisan support for this resolution makes success in the United Nations more likely, and therefore, war less likely,” declared Sen. Clinton.
As for Sen. Kerry, he offered a pretty solid critique of Bush’s policy: “There is no justification whatsoever for sending Americans for the first time in American history as the belligerent, as the initiator of it, as a matter of first instance, without a showing of an imminent threat to our country.” Kerry claimed he supported UN inspections and, only if Iraq refused to cooperate, true multinational military action against Saddam. Yet Kerry voted, in effect, to put the loaded .44 in the Bush’s holster and tell him “do what you got to do.” Pressed for an explanation the next week, Kerry actually did say, “He has a free hand to make a catastrophic mistake.” Was Kerry opposing Bush or appeasing him? Hard to tell.
I’m inclined to give all the good cops, including Blair and Powell, the benefit of the doubt. It’s disappointing that so few chose to take a firm stand against the final, hysterical, hyped-up rush to invade. (British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, who resigned, is the only one who comes to mind.) But I’m not sure that, even collectively, they would have had the power to stop the war. Saddam was stupid. Those in the Bush administration who intended all along to eliminate him were not. Nobody wanted to be cast as defending the Butcher of Baghdad. And the brinksmanship, after all, did work-until the bad cop went ballistic.
Next week: Facts on the Ground, or, The Good News From Iraq
